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The Copyrightability of Jokes: "Take My
Registration Deposit. . .Please!"
By GAYLE HERMAN*
I
Introduction
Jokes, by definition, are not meant to be taken seriously.
Yet, there is a certain segment of society that does take humor
very seriously. It consists of the creators of comedy, whose
livelihood rests on the very words that others laugh at. The
joke writer, who writes with expectations of both public recog-
nition and financial reward for his comic output, too often ends
up being cheated of both.
The joke writer and the comic/comedian are in practice two
separate, although often overlapping, classes of artists who
suffer quite different harms when their respective works are
misappropriated. The joke writer is one who makes his living
writing comedy for others; the comic/comedian, on the other
hand, may write but always performs his material for
audiences.'
All creators of comedy are compensated pecuniarily, with
pay checks or other parallel benefits.2 However, while both the
* Member, Third Year Class, University of California, Los Angeles Law School.
B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1981.
This note was prompted by the inspirational teachings of Professor Melville Nim-
mer. The author wishes to give special thanks to Mr. Davre J. Davidson and to the
many joke writers and comics who were of such great and often amusing assistance in
unveiling the standard practices of the current comedy industry. Special thanks to
those at the Comedy Store, the Los Angeles workshop-nightclub for stand-up comedi-
ans. The Comedy Store has become an institution for comedy and the birthplace of
many modern notables such as Robin Williams, Gabe Kaplan, Richard Pryor and, as
the sign outside the Store reads, "a host of others unknown now but who will in the
very near future become celebrated entertainers in their own right."
1. The joke writer and the comic/comedian will, however, be treated similarly for
the purposes of this note. Humorist Ed Wynn further distinguished the comic from
the comedian by saying, "The comic is one who says funny things; whereas, the come-
dian is one who says things funny." Interview with Billy Braver, comedian, in Los
Angeles (Feb. 27, 1983). Such a fine distinction is not important here.
2. Cf. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950
(9th Cir. 1954) (the court declared, "Authors work for the love of their art no more than
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joke writer and the comedian suffer monetary harm when their
works are pirated, the latter must face the added injury of be-
ing robbed of the emotional gratification he could have
achieved from performance. This does not diminish the harm
to the joke writers, who, like other authors deprived of credit
for their works, are robbed of the well-earned recognition that
often leads to future work.'
While only a foolhardy thief would openly copy another's
book, song or greeting card and disseminate it to the public
without fear of the consequences, it is common practice for
even the most respected entertainers blatantly to steal the cre-
ations of a joke writer. This note examines the plight of the
comedy writer and addresses the question of what protection,
if any, the joke is afforded under copyright law. Beginning
with an exploration of the joke-writing industry and the unique
function of humor in society, this note proceeds with an over-
view of the limited case law regarding the copyrightability of
jokes. It then assesses the feasibility of extending protection
to the joke under the terms of the 1976 Copyright Act,4 and ad-
dresses the unique attributes of a joke which both support and
hinder any such extension. This note concludes with a propo-
sal for the enforcement of the rights and remedies of the joke
writer.'
other professional people work in other lines of work. . . .There is the financial mo-
tive as well.").
3. Cf. Poe v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (preliminary
injunction denied) (the court said, "A writer's reputation, which would be greatly en-
hanced by public credit for authorship ... is his stock in trade; it is clear that irrepara-
ble injury would follow the failure to give him screen credit if in fact he is entitled to
it." (footnote omitted)). See also Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (re-
moval of actor's name from credits and substitution of another's was basis of suit
under Lanham Act).
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976). Much of the case law discussed in this note in-
volved the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810. The 1976 Act revised and recodified
the law, but it is clear from the legislative history that the revision was not intended to
change the scope of copyright protection. See House Report on the Copyright Act of
1976, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5679 (1976).
5. While this note will at times discuss the copyright law and its relationship to
gags and comedic style, which overlap with the joke, its primary focus will be on the
copyrightability of the joke.
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II
The Nature of the Industry
A. The Problematic Practice of Plagiarism
As far back as the 1300's, joke piracy was a common practice.6
Compilers frequently stole from each other, with jokes and
anecdotes duplicated and revised to suit the changing tastes of
different towns and times.'
Comic Joey Adams admits that in the New York Catskills re-
sorts of the 1930's, better known as the "Borscht Belt," the
usual method of obtaining material was to "lift from the best."8
Things have not changed since then. Comedian Billy Braver
was furious when he discovered that his entire routine had
been pirated and sold in pamphlet form to Las Vegas nightclub
entertainers.9 Although many clubs and comedy houses now
prohibit members of the audience from bringing tape recorders
or writing tablets into the shows, joke stealing continues. As
one comic worded the problem, "Pilferers adapt easily to new
house rules. They now bring in smaller tape recorders."'"
B. Practical Protection for the Joke Writer
Things are not so bleak for the established comedy writer
who is in demand. Successful film and television writer Shel-
don Keller notes, "Today I have an agent [and an] attorney
and register everything with the Writer's Guild." But even
6. L. UNTERMEYER, TREASURY OF GREAT HUMOR 661 (1972).
7. Id.
8. See J. ADAMS & H. TOBIAS, THE BORSCHT BELT 61-69 (1966).
9. Interview with Billy Braver, comedian, in Los Angeles (Feb. 27, 1983). Mr.
Braver has appeared regularly over the last 15 years in comedy clubs across the United
States, as well as having made several television appearances.
10. Interview with Argus Hamilton, comedian, in Los Angeles (Mar. 18, 1983). Mr.
Hamilton performs regularly at "The Comedy Store" in Los Angeles, and estimates
that at least 10% of his work is stolen.
11. Interview with Sheldon Keller, film and television writer/producer, in Los An-
geles (Feb. 19, 1983). Mr. Keller has written comedy for, among others, Bob Hope,
Jonathan Winters, Danny Kaye and Dick Van Dyke, in addition to having written and
produced several films, including House Calls, Buena Sera Mrs. Campbell, Movie-
Movie and various episodes of the highly successful television series M*A *S*H.
The Writer's Guild of America is a nongovernmental depository in which member
and nonmember authors may deposit a copy of a work to be held in a sealed envelope.
As of 1983, the cost for deposit was $10 for nonmembers and $5 for members. For an
example of this procedure see Davies v. Krasna, 245 Cal. App. 2d 535, 550, 54 Cal. Rptr.
37, 46 (1966). To qualify for Guild membership one must have sold original material or
be a current employee of a Guild signatory. The initiation fee into the Guild is $1,500.
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still," says Keller, who started out as a stand-up comic himself,
"there are slippages . . . a bit is stolen now and then ...."12
The lesser known joke writer or comic, however, has very lit-
tle, if any, protection. Because the Writer's Guild only regis-
ters works for motion pictures, radio or television, it offers little
help to the many comics who do not write for the screen or
broadcast media. For those who do qualify, registration with a
depository such as the Writer's Guild confers no statutory pro-
tection; it serves only as evidentiary, and not conclusive, proof
as to a writer's claim to authorship and the date of the mate-
rial's completion. 3 While some joke writers partake of the
"Poor Man's Copyright," which consists of an author mailing a
copy of his work to himself and then opening the sealed envel-
ope in court, such a practice is also not conclusive as to origi-
nality.14 Furthermore, this procedure, unlike a deposit with
the Writer's Guild, carries the risk that the trier of fact will con-
clude that the envelope was opened, altered and then resealed
prior to trial.'5
Oddly, most comics rely on a self-imposed good faith prac-
tice in their industry as the manner of sole protection. This
system of self-policing is possible because most comedians in a
given area are aware of each other's existence and acts. Thus,
the nonlegal ramifications of pirating and performing another's
material might include, at least, a demand for an apology and,
at most, a blacklisting from work in one's "town. '"16 None of
these consequences are to be taken lightly, especially black-
listing, because of the importance that obtaining local work can
play in a rising comic's career. 17
For further information, see generally Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc., Los Ange-
les, pamphlet informational material (1983).
12. Interview with Sheldon Keller, supra note 11.
13. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 [A], at 13-5 (1982).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 13-5 n.20. See Smith v. Berlin, 207 Misc. 862, 141 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113, 117-18
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). Compare Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393,
1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court rejected a notarized certificate establishing a given date of
completion of the work) with 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (making the copyright registration cer-
tificate prima facie evidence in favor of plaintiff) and 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13,
§ 13.01 [A] at 13-4 (stating that, unlike deposit with the Writer's Guild or the "Poor
Man's Copyright," the copyright registration certificate establishes "prima facie evi-
dence ... on the issue of originality ... copyrightability of subject matter, and citizen-
ship of author. .. ").
16. Interview with Argus Hamilton, supra note 10.
17. Id. Mr. Hamilton noted that the greenhorn comic often gets his start by devel-
oping a distinctive look, first, by performing the early evening and late night shows,
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Unfortunately, this "Comedic Code of Ethics" has hardly
served as a reliable mechanism of protection. An intra-com-
munity "watch" does nothing to prevent comedy thieves from
travelling to other cities to perform pilfered acts. In fact, many
celebrity comics purchase and perform material unaware that
they are capitalizing on stolen goods.
III
Why Jokes Warrant Protection
A. The Functions of Humor
Joke writing is a talent for which authors have been paid
since the days of the court jester. The Copyright Act protects
"works of authorship;" it does not question the literary or so-
cial value of a protected work.18 Nevertheless, the virtues of
the joke as "verbal art"'9 are not to be ignored. A joke per-
forms at least four functions for society: enlightenment, socio-
political and moral influence, catharsis, and entertainment.
Jokes enlighten and inform us by bringing to our attention
an amazingly broad range of subjects which might not other-
wise be topics of everyday discussion. This enlightenment
function is enhanced by the transient nature of a joke; as
Sigmund Freud commented, "A new joke acts like an event of
universal interest. It passes from person to person like the
news of the latest conquest. '20
Closely related to the enlightenment function is the poten-
tial a joke has for making an impact on society's politics and
morals. Bringing a topic into the public forum, albeit in a comi-
cal light, can be the first step towards change. "To lay bare vice
in its less aggressive shapes, to expose it, is to improve the age
[in which] we live ....
Jokes can serve a cathartic function as well. This theory of
and then, he hopes by graduating to prime-time slots and reserved club dates at local
comedy houses. These appearances not only help the comic to evolve and perfect his
act, but also can serve as "springboards to success."
18. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
19. P. MCGHEE, CHILDREN'S HUMOR 91 (1980).
20. L. UNTERMEYER, supra note 6, at 661 (quoting S. FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELA-
TION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS (1960)).
21. L. UNTERMEYER, supra note 6. See also M. McLuHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS
THE MASSAGE 10 (1967) (Marshall McLuhan, speaking of the educational benefits of
humor, states, "Our time presents a unique opportunity for learning by means of hu-
mor-a perceptive or incisive joke can be more meaningful than platitudes lying be-
tween two covers.").
No. 21
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joketelling provides that by using speech as a vehicle to re-
lease aggressions, man will be less violent in his actions. How-
ever, the cathartic function can have a negative impact. For
example, ethnic jokes can, while serving as a catharsis for the
speaker, reinforce stereotypes and undesirable thinking.22
The most obvious function of the joke, its entertainment
value, is not to be taken lightly.2" Humor has been called "the
point where pain and pleasure meet to produce a third element
which partakes of both-a voluptuous torture, like being
pinched by a pretty girl. ' 24 If a joke produces a grin or a sar-
donic "Oh, that was awful," its entertainment function has
been fulfilled.
B. The Fleeting Value of Comedy
Audiences have a fragile appetite for jokes. As the court
noted in Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp. ,25 ,[1]t is
common knowledge that the repeated use of comedy detracts
from its force as amusement."26 In another case, the court
granted a plaintiff $8,000 for the use of his isolated "gags," stat-
ing that "once such material is used, the value therein is gone
,,27
Compounding the joke's short-lived value is its limited mar-
ketability. Even if a book is misappropriated, it would not lose
all potential market value because there are still opportunities
for the story to be utilized in other media, such as film or thea-
ter. However, the future uses of a joke, once told, are virtually
nil. Since the lost "virginity" of a joke can never be recaptured,
the importance to the author in having exclusive control over
his comedic works is great.
22. See Novak, The Sting of the Polish Joke, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1976, at 13, for a
discussion of some of the ramifications of ethnic humor. See also Levy, Poland's Polish
Jokes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 22; Sexist Humor, Sci. DIG., Nov.
1976, at 21.
23. In discussing the value of works created primarily for entertainment, Califor-
nia Supreme Court Chief Justice Bird noted, "Our courts have often observed that
entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of
ideas." Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 867, 160 Cal. Rptr.
352, 356-57 (1979). See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (the court
remarked, "The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive ....
What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine.").
24. S. Cox, WHY WE LAUGH 14 (1880).
25. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
26. Id. at 369.
27. Yadkoe v. Fields, 66 Cal. App. 2d 150, 161, 151 P.2d 906, 912 (1944).
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C. Inadequacy of Other Types of Protection
1. Express and Implied Contract Theories
Joke writers can always achieve protection of their work
through an express contract. Additionally, a court may find an
implied contract if consent of the parties is evidenced by con-
duct rather than through words.28
Recovery under a contract theory, however, is severely lim-
ited in that it requires privity between the contracting parties.
Hence, as generally is the case with joke piracy, if a plaintiff
never submits his work to the defendant, but the latter never-
theless appropriates the material after gaining access to it
through some means other than the plaintiffs submission,
there can be no recovery under a theory of implied contract.29
Due to the absence of privity, the joke writer will also rarely be
protected under a theory of breach of confidential
relationship. 0
2. Unfair Competition
Although European moral rights3 would be of great benefit
to the joke writer, as well as to other authors, the United States
accords no recognition of moral rights either in the Copyright
Act or in state or federal case law.3 2 Yet courts have some-
28. See, e.g., id. at 154, 151 P.2d at 908 (court permitted recovery on the theory of
defendant's implied contract with plaintiff, despite the fact that defendant W.C. Fields
accepted and used plaintiffs unsolicited gags while he expressly termed his accept-
ance as "gratis"). See also Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956); Weitzen-
korn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
29. See, e.g., Curtis v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 213 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Borden & Bar-
ton Enter. v. Warner Bros. Broadcasting Corp., 99 Cal. App. 2d 760, 222 P.2d 463 (1950);
Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 254 Cal. App. 593, 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1966).
30. Cf. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F.2d 685, 686 (2d Cir. 1930); see also 12 A.R.
MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 4.03 at 4-12 (1967).
31. "Droit moral," or moral rights, are the personal rights of the author, separate
and apart from those in copyright. Such rights are widely recognized in Europe. They
include the right to be known as the author of one's work and the right to prevent
others from being named author or from making changes in one's work. Moral rights
appear to be of greatest importance in France, Law No. 57-206, Mar. 11, 1957, Art. 6;
German Federal Republic, Law of Sept. 9, 1965, Art. 12014; and Italy, Law No. 633, Apr.
22, 1941, Arts. 20-24. See generally 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, §§ 8.21 [A]-8.21[B], at 8-
247.
32. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
("American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights ...
since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of au-
thors."); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); Crimi v. Rutgers Pres-
byterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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times recognized an author's moral rights under different theo-
ries, such as unfair competition.33
In Smith v. Montoro 34 an actor who starred in defendant's
motion picture claimed that a violation of Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act3 5 occurred when the defendant deleted the actor's
name and substituted another's in the film credits. The court
held for the plaintiff, reasoning that "reverse passing off,"
which consists of the unauthorized removal or obliteration of
the original trademark on goods produced by another before
the resale of such goods, constituted a violation of Section
43(a).3 6 The court further concluded that "misrepresentation"
occurs when the name of another is substituted for the true
star's name. Such a principle would appear to apply equally
to an author's rights.
There is a problem if, as is generally the case, the misap-
propriator of a joke does not expressly hold himself out as au-
thor, but merely uses a plaintiff's material without mention of
its originator. In dicta, the Montoro court commented that
even when a defendant only deletes the plaintiffs name and
does not substitute another's name in its place, this is a form of
"implied reverse passing off" and, as such, also violates the
33. See Runge v. Lee, 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887 (1971)
(court held that if the reproduction of the author's work is unauthorized and if some-
one else is credited therein as the author of the work, then this may give rise to a cause
of action for unfair competition).
34. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
35. Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services ... a false description or origin, or any false description or
representation . . . and shall cause such goods or services to enter into com-
merce ... shall be liable to a civil action. . . by any person who believes that
he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description ....
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act may also be violated if the
plaintiff's name is used in such manner as to misrepresent the nature of his contribu-
tions to the work. See Follett v. Arbor House Publishing Co., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
36. "Passing off," or "palming off," as it is sometimes called, has been defined as
"appropriation not of the creation but of the value attached to it by public association
(the so-called 'secondary meaning'), by misleading the public into thinking that the
defendant's offering is the product of the plaintiffs established skill." Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1967). See, e.g., Lone Ranger,
Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942). See generally 1 H. Nnvs, UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADEMARKS 52 (4th ed. 1947). See also Borchard, Reverse Passing Off-Commer-
cial Robbery or Permissible Competition? 67 TRADE-MARK REP. 1 (1977).
37. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 607 (court stating, "Since actor's fees . . .and
indeed, their ability to get any work at all, is often based on the drawing power their
name may be expected to have at the box office, being accurately credited for film is
... of critical importance in enabling [actors] . .. to sell their 'services'....")
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Lanham Act.38
A successful suit under unfair competition theory appears to
be possible, but tenuous. Since courts have yet to recognize
"implied reverse passing off," and since "express reverse pass-
ing off" requires that the joke "stealer" designate himself as
author of the joke, unfair competition laws may not prove to be
all that helpful.
3. Right of Publicity
The right of publicity, defined generally as "the interest of
the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity, in so far
as it is represented by his name or likeness, '' 39 is gaining in-
creasing acceptance in the United States. 40  In recognizing a
right of publicity as it applied to comedians Laurel and
Hardy,41 and a few years later to the Marx Brothers,4 courts
have extended the right to include the comedian's jokes, gags,
and routines.
38. Id. at 605, 606 n.5. But cf. Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C.
1980) (court held that at common law there is no action for failure to attribute author-
ship or for misappropriation without attribution).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(c) (1976).
40. It was not until 1953 that a federal court sitting in New York determined that a
common law right of action denominated as "the right of publicity" existed. See Hae-
lan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). Since
Haelan, the right of publicity has been recognized explicitly in numerous jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, New York); Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 816 (1953) (New York); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139
Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977) (California), rev'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Canessa
v. J.I. Kislak Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 351-52, 235 A.2d 62, 76 (1967) (New Jersey);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 231-34, 351 N.E.2d 454,
458-60 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (Ohio). See generally Felcher
& Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J.
1577 (1979); Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
Nw. U.L. REV. 553 (1960); Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (1981). See also Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954), for an earlier treatment of the development of the right of
publicity.
41. Price v. Worldvision Enters. Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 263 (1978) (court enjoined
defendants from using deceased comedians Laurel and Hardy's "name [sI likeness...
(together with the] comedy, humor, pathos, routines, material, situations, and formats
42. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (court held that a stage play
where one-half of the show was comprised of performers imitating the appearance and
comedic style of the Marx Brothers violated the deceased comedians' right of
publicity).
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However, the right of publicity is still not universally recog-
nized, and as yet it is unclear if other courts would extend this
right to cover a comic's material, for example, his jokes, as well
as, or as part of, his "name and likeness." Furthermore, al-
though the right of publicity, an attribute of celebrities, might
come to the rescue of widely known comics such as Laurel and
Hardy and Groucho Marx, who have created a marketable im-
age for themselves, it will do little to help the great majority of
comics who have not yet and may never become recognizable
for their names and likenesses.
IV
Are Jokes Protected Under the Copyright Laws?
It is clear that the comic is in need of protection and the most
desirable protection under the law is that afforded by
copyright.
A. Precedent in the Courts
There is surprisingly little case law on the protection of jokes
by copyright law. The first cases to address the subject arose
in England in the early part of this century.43 While those
early cases never explicitly held jokes to be copyrightable,"
the British courts strongly suggested that such comic matter
43. The copyright law of Great Britain is governed by the Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5
Eliz. 2 ch. 74, which replaced its earlier statutory version, the Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2
Geo. 5 ch. 46. While similar to the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 in many respects, the
British Act grants exclusive copyright protection to authors of both unpublished and
published original works (Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz., 2 ch., § 1), irrespective of the
artistic quality of those works (id. § 3). The British copyright, subsisting in the work,
continues for fifty years from the end of the calendar year in which the author died (id.
§ 2). The rights vested by the Act in the copyright owner are the rights to reproduce
the work in any form, publish the work, perform the work in public, broadcast the
work, cause the work to be transmitted to subscribers to a different "diffusion service,"
make any adaptation of the work, and do, in relation to an adaption of the work, any of
the aforementioned acts. (Id. § 2(5)). See generally 7 HAISBURY'S STATUTES OF ENG-
LAND 128 (3d ed. 1969).
44. See Tate v. Fullbrook 1 K.B. 821, 98 L.T.R. 706, 77 L.J.K.B. 577 (1908) (the British
Court of Appeals held that the taking of comic "gags" from a stage play was not copy-
right infringement because the gags lacked the "certainty" required for copyright; the
gags were not "permanent parts of the play, but rather intended to be changed from
time to time," and thus could not be the proper subjects of copyright). See also Mc-
Crum v. Eisner, 87 L.J. Ch. 99, 117 L.T.R. 536 (1917) MacG. C.C. (1917-23) 14 (action for
infringement of plaintiff's joke dismissed on grounds of no originality with plaintiff,
and no access or copying by defendant proven); Regent Publishing Co. v. Bamforth &
Co., MacG. C.C. (1923-28) 150 (action for misappropriation of joke from "vulgar seaside
postcard" in which court found no infringement on grounds that, although there was
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could be the proper subject of copyright, provided the requisite
elements, such as originality, were met.45
American courts have been more definite, having held that
jokes in some instances will be protected.' However, the ex-
tent to which copyright covers the realm of jokes is ambiguous.
In what was apparently the first American case to address the
issue, Hoffman v. Le Traunik,47 the court refused to label de-
fendant's misappropriation of complainant's disconnected
jokes and monologues an infringement of copyright, but only
because such works were not original with complainant. In-
deed, the court in Hoffman suggested that had such jokes and
monologues been original, they would have been fully pro-
tected under copyright law.49
In Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp. ,0 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the copying of fifty-seven
original comedy scenes from plaintiffs motion picture consti-
tuted an infringement, the comedic material being the proper
subject of copyright protection. However, in holding the
scenes or "gags" copyrightable, the court stressed the fact that
the amount "taken" comprised twenty percent of plaintiff's en-
tire motion picture.5 ' Such scenes, noted the court, constituted
copying of the idea, there was not sufficient similarity between the two expressions of
that idea).
45. In McCrum and Regent Publishing Co., supra note 44, the British courts did not
question the copyrightability of the subject matter of jokes, but only held that there
were no infringements of copyright in those cases because the requisite elements of
infringement actions were not met. In McCrum, there was no originality of the joke
with plaintiff or copying by defendant; in Regent, there was no copying of the expres-
sion but only the idea. In the earliest case, Tate, supra note 44, although the court said
gags lacking "certainty" could not properly be the subject of copyright, by implication
this suggests that gags with the requisite certainty would be afforded the benefits of
copyright. Further, there was a strong dissent in Tate by Mr. Justice Jeff who thought
that the sketch in question, consisting of "comic incidents, knockabout, and occasional
gags" was within the protection of copyright. See E.J. MACGILiVRAY, COPYRIGHT
CASES 1905-1910, at 137 (London, 1969), for further discussion of Tate.
46. See, e.g., Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1947); Douglas Int'l Corp. v. Baker, 335 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Marvin Worth
Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
47. 209 F. 375 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
48. For example, complainant's jokes and monologues included such one-liners as,
"It gives me great pleasure and joy to stand and undress myself before this large ag-
gravation." Id. at 375.
49. Id. at 379 (the court stated, "If there is any piracy in this case, it consists in the
taking and use of these ... gags ... and to constitute infringement it must be estab-
lished by the complainant that they were original with him .....
50. 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
51. Id. at 363.
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a sequence of vital importance to the story, not mere "comedic
accretion," isolated "gags," or "stage business."52
Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp. ," decided
nearly a quarter of a century after Harold Loyd, involved an
infringement suit brought against film producers by the assign-
ees in copyright of two books by and about the late nightclub
entertainer Lenny Bruce. After deleting from the realm of pro-
tection a "few jokes which involve . . . stock situations" and
lack "the quality of originality necessary to render them copy-
rightable," the court went on to hold that the remainder of
Bruce's books, composed of commentaries, jokes, monologues
and routines, was fully protected by copyright.5 4
In a subsequent case involving the same Lenny Bruce books,
Douglas International Corp. v. Baker,55 the court again re-
jected the argument that the books constituted noncopyright-
able material, stating that "defendants have not submitted
adequate affidavits alleging that any of Bruce's particular rou-
tines are stock .... The broad allegation that Bruce took ma-
terial from other comedians is insufficient. '56
In Smothers v. Columbia Broadcasting System,S the District
Court upheld an award of damages to plaintiff comic Tommy
Smothers against the defendant network for broadcasting epi-
sodes of the television series "The Smothers Brothers Comedy
Hour" without the permission of Smothers, the copyright
owner. Although the court only addressed the issue of
whether such work is protected against unlicensed broadcast,
it did recognize, in ruling for plaintiff, that a valid copyright can
subsist in a television series which consists of, among other
features, various sketches and gags.58
52. Id. Cf. Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906, 907 (S.D.N.Y.
1937) (court found that although defendants had clear access to and copied plaintiffs
manuscript scene of a "little negro boy ... who, whilst fanning a dinner table to keep
away flies ... [mistakenly) . . . strikes ... [a guest] on the side of the head with his
fan .... " there was no copyright infringement because the scene taken was merely
"comic accretion" and "not intrinsic to the story development thereof"); Dymow v. Bol-
ton 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926).
53. 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
54. Id. at 1270. The court subsequently issued an injunction against the
defendants.
55. 335 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
56. Id. at 285.
57. 359 F. Supp. 723 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
58. By recognizing that a valid copyright can subsist in comedic sketches and gags,
was the court here, in effect, granting copyright protection to what had been earlier
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In sum, this chronological survey of American case law can
be interpreted as evidencing an increasing willingness on the
part of the courts to grant copyright protection to purely come-
dic matter. While the Harold Lloyd case seems to imply that
only comedic scenes which constitute a substantial part of a
larger story are eligible for protection, the Marvin Worth and
Douglas International courts held that books comprised of
jokes, monologues and routines are protected provided the ma-
terial is original. The court in Douglas International went so
far as to presume originality, even in light of allegations,
though broadly based, that the aggrieved comedian had taken
from others.59 All of these cases involved the 1909 Copyright
Act;6  it is uncertain whether treatment under the 1976 Copy-
right Act61 would be any different.
B. Questions Unanswered by the Courts
In light of the scant case law available, the perimeters of the
copyrightability of jokes are uncertain. The only reasonably
sure conclusion is that jokes incorporated within a larger pro-
tectible work, such as a motion picture (Harold Lloyd) or a
book (Marvin Worth), can be protected under the copyright of
that larger work. In Harold Lloyd this protection was qualified
by the fact that the amount "taken" composed a "substantial
portion" of the larger protected work.
Courts have left unanswered two questions of major impor-
tance to joke writers:
1) Whether a joke which is incorporated as part of the pro-
tectible larger work can have a protectible life in and of it-
self, so that the taking of such a joke or gag, even if it is not
considered a "substantial portion" of the larger work, con-
stitutes an infringement; and
2) Whether a joke which is not part of a larger protectible
work can be protected by copyright.
With regard to the first question, the approach the courts have
taken in non-comedic areas focuses on whether the material
copied comprises a "substantial portion" of plaintiff's work.62
termed unprotectible "comic accretion"? Cf. Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc.,
20 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. Copyright Act of 1909, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
810 (1982).
61. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
62. See, e.g., Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 246 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1957); Malkin
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Although the courts have not been clear on how little material
will meet this test,63 at least one case has held that the copying
of but a single sentence constituted a "substantial taking" for
infringement purposes. 4
One might ask whether the "substantial portion" test for
copyright infringement is an appropriate one to apply to the
taking of jokes when they are incorporated within a larger pro-
tected work. If a defendant misappropriates one original joke
from plaintiffs motion picture and uses it in his own late-night
television act, the benefits the defendant will derive from the
use of the stolen joke will be the same whether or not the joke
is labeled a "substantial portion" of plaintiff's work. Namely,
the defendant will enhance his own act through the wrongful
appropriation of the fruits of another's labor.
On the other hand, what harm will the plaintiff suffer if the
defendant makes unauthorized use of an original joke consti-
tuting, presumably, an insubstantial part of the plaintiff's mo-
tion picture? First, an audience that hears the joke from the
defendant prior to seeing the plaintiff's film might, albeit sub-
consciously, label the plaintiff as unoriginal. Additionally, the
humor of the one joke will most likely be lessened when heard
for the second time, detracting from the film's impact as a
whole. This will be especially injurious to the plaintiff's work
when, as will often be the case, the one joke pirated happens to
be the funniest line in the film. Furthermore, the "substantial
portion" test completely ignores the plaintiff's potential market
v. Dubinsky, 146 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,
348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Mr. Justice Story described the "substantial portion"
test as being satisfied when "so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly
diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent
appropriated by another. . . ."). See generally 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 13, § 13.03[A],
at 13-17.
63. Compare Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302
(E.D. Pa. 1938) (copying of three sentences held substantial where used by defendant
for advertising purposes) and Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Iowa 1977) (copying of one paragraph, con-
sisting of three sentences, held to infringe) with Turner v. Century House Publishing
Co., 56 Misc. 2d 1071, 290 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1968) (substantial copying of an entire chapter
from plaintiff's book into defendant's work held not to infringe) and Rokeach v. Avco
Embassy Pictures Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (copying 100 words
out of a total of 70,000 held de minimis). See 3 M. NIMER, supra note 13, § 13.03[A], at
13-16, for further examples.
64. Dawn Assocs. v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 831, 833 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (the sen-
tence, a part of promotional advertising for a motion picture, read: "When there is no
room in hell ... the dead will walk the earth.").
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for the joke. Even if the plaintiff's film is relatively unharmed,
the unauthorized use by the defendant is still a use that the
true author could potentially be making of the material.
There is harm, then, to a joke writer whether one or one hun-
dred of his jokes are pirated from his larger work, and whether
or not the taking is "substantial." It would seem more just,
therefore, to view the original jokes incorporated in a larger
work as having protectible lives in and of themselves. Yet to
date, courts have not addressed this issue.
Whether a joke which is not incorporated within a larger pro-
tected work is copyrightable is the more vital question to the
average comic, who still lacks that leverage of success neces-
sary to incorporate material into a larger protectible work. It is
this question that seems to be one of first impression, and to
which we now turn.
V
An Assessment of Jokes Under the Copyright Act
A. The Joke As A "Work of Authorship"
The Constitution grants Congress broad powers to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries. 65 To the dismay of many
authors, Congress has chosen not to exercise its full authority
to provide copyright protection for all "writings." The Copy-
right Act of 1976 provides that protection shall subsist only in
"original works of authorship."66 However, "works of author-
ship" are not necessarily limited to the seven broad categories
of works listed under Section 102(a) of the Act itself.67 The
House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 states that the
phrase "original works of authorship" is "purposely left unde-
65. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides that Congress shall have the power "[tlo
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) reads in part: "Works of authorship include the following
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings." The House Report of the Copy-
right Act of 1976 explicitly states that these categories are "illustrative and not limita-
tive." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659.
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fined. '68 Thus, whether a joke, a non-enumerated work, can
properly be deemed a "work of authorship" for copyright pur-
poses requires further consideration.
It seems that jokes can be labelled as "works of authorship"
in one of two ways. First, jokes can be deemed a subset of one
of the Section 102(a) broad categories, or second, as the House
Report suggests, they can derive protection as non-enumer-
ated forms of expression which have been "in existence for
generations . . . [but which have] only gradually come to be
recognized as creative and worthy of protection. 69 Classifica-
tion under this second alternative seems less likely in light of
the House Report's implication that works of this type will not
be protected unless explicitly described by statutory
amendment.7 °
The more plausible, and seemingly probable, method of ex-
tending copyright protection to jokes would be to include them
under the section 102(a) (1) heading of "literary works."'" The
term "literary" in this context "does not connote any criterion
of literary merit or qualitative value. '7 2 "The essence of a liter-
ary work is, then, that it consist of 'verbal or numerical sym-
bols or indicia.' "1 Indeed, in Hoffman v. Le Traunik,'4 the
court described the written jokes and gags in that case as being
"literary productions ... under the head. . 'light literature',
which is said to be . . .writings intended primarily for en-
68. H.R. REP., supra note 67, at 51 ("The bill does not intend either to freeze the
scope of copyrightable technology at the present stage of communications technology
or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present congres-
sional intent."). See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.03 [A], at 2-24, for a dis-
cussion of "works of authorship."
69. H.R. REP., supra note 67, at 51. Choreography, for example, unprotected and
not enumerated under the 1909 Act, was explicitly recognized as a work of authorship
under the 1976 Act (§ 102(a) (4)). Titles, however, which are arguably constitutional
"writings" worthy of protection, were not granted protection under the 1909 Act or by
court decisions. Titles are not in the section 102 (a) enumeration of protected catego-
ries in the present Act, and thereby appear not to be considered protected "works of
authorship" for copyright purposes. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.03 [A], at 2-26.
70. H.R. REP., supra note 67, at 51.
71. Title 17, § 101 defines "literary works" as "works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal numerical symbols or indicia, regardless
of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, pho-
norecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982).
72. H.R. REP., supra note 67, at 54.
73. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.04[A], at 2-39.
74. 209 F. 375 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
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tertainment, relaxation, or amusement." 75
It has been said that a joke is simply a compressed short
story, stripped to its point, while many short stories are merely
extended jokes .7  The joke's close, often inseparable, relation
to other forms of works in the literary domain,77 leads us to
conclude that jokes should merit the same protection. Poems,
for instance, were protected as "literary works" under the 1909
Copyright Act.78 Included in the category of poetry is the lim-
erick, which is essentially a humorous five-line poem. Remove
the rhyme, and there is little to distinguish the limerick from
the joke. Clearly, it is not the rhyme of a poem which is deter-
minative of copyrightability, because unrhymed poems, such
as free verse, also merit copyright protection.
Finally, there is one additional hint from the legislative his-
tory of the 1976 Copyright Act, indicating that jokes were not
meant to be denied the status of "works of authorship." The
House Committee Report on an earlier version of the 1976
Copyright Act, suggested, in a later deleted footnote explaining
section 102, that several classes of works were not in them-
selves protectible; among those nonprotected works were "ti-
tles, slogans, and similar short expressions."79 Jokes were not
included in this ill-fated list.
B. Fixation in a Tangible Medium
Assuming that a joke is a "work of authorship," the Copy-
right Act also requires that a work be "fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression"80 before protection is granted.
Presumably, this would not impose a heavy burden for the joke
writer with preconceived material; he need only write down his
material on paper, record it on tape, or fix it in some other "tan-
gible form."'" However, what recourse does the Act provide for
75. Id. at 377.
76. L. UNTERMEYER, A TREASURY OF LAUGHTER xviii (1946).
77. MCGHEE, supra note 19, at 91.
78. See, e.g., Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd,
536 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976) (poem "Desiderata" protected by copyright).
79. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 n.1 (1966), accompanying the H.R.
REP. No. 4347.
80. Title 17, § 102(a) states that works of authorship must be "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
81. Title 17, § 101 states, "A work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
No. 21
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the comedian who, during a live performance, ad-libs material
not previously reduced to tangible form?
The Copyright Act protects live broadcasts by providing that:
"A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of
the work is being made simultaneously with its transmis-
sion.' 82  This clause is further qualified by a definition of
"transmit" as to communicate a performance "by any device or
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the
place from which they are sent. ", 83
Paradoxically, the Copyright Act appears then to protect
only the ad-libs of those who have already achieved enough
recognition to reap the benefits of "simultaneous transmis-
sion" by television, radio, or the like. It therefore seems that
the ad-libbing of the comic relegated to the more common beat
of doing "stand up" performances without the glories of broad-
cast attention is free for the stealing.84 As Professor Nimmer
humorously suggests, "[p] erhaps for the nightclub improviser,
the solution lies in telephoning his live performance."" The
nonbroadcasting comic desiring federal protection for his cre-
ations appears to have no choice but to pre-record all of his
material, including his ad-libs-a task which is, by the very def-
inition of "ad-lib," nearly impossible.
C. The Requirement of Originality
As noted above, the Copyright Act only protects "original
works of authorship."86 However, the popular conception
seems to be that no joke is really new, but that each has its
origins in the hinterlands of another day, the product of some
distant jokesmith.87 It is said that "if Adam came back to earth,
the only thing he would recognize would be the jokes."88
The origins of a joke may go back many years. Compilers
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
82. Id.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. But see CAL. CIV. CODE, § 980(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982) (protecting under com-
mon law copyright, works of authorship "not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression").
85. 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 13, § 1.08[c], at 1-53.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
87. From that prolific author, "Anonymous."
88. L. COPELAN, 10,000 JOKES, TOASTS, AND STORIES 3 (1965).
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were busy gathering and circulating jokes years before the first
English Bible was issued in 1535.89 Many jokes are merely up-
dated versions of ancient precursors.9" Does the fact that
many jokes are simply updated jests of yester-year affect their
copyrightability?
In view of the long history of humor, it might be difficult to
come up with a joke that has never been told before; to prove
such originality would be equally difficult. However, the de-
gree of originality required by the Copyright Act is not the rig-
orous "novelty" standard demanded in patent law.9' Instead,
originality for purposes of copyright means only that the work
"owes its origin to the author,"92 that is, that the work was in-
dependently created and not copied from other works.9 3 In ad-
dition, the quantum of originality required for copyright is
slight. Any "distinguishable variation" of a prior work will suf-
fice if such variation is the product of the author's independent
efforts and is more than merely "trivial."94
With the lenient definition of originality under copyright law,
it is not at all difficult to imagine situations in which jokes are
not copied, but are independently created. It has been said,
"Where there is an original sound in the world, it makes one
thousand echoes."95 These words appropriately point out two
aspects of human life: one, that copying others' works is not an
89. L. UNTERMEYER, supra note 6, at 661.
90. Id. at 662. Untermeyer cites as an example the following ancient favorite as it
appeared in Wit and Mirth, published in 1630 by John Taylor.
A gathering of neighbors that dwelt on one side of a street said, "It is reported
that all those who dwell on our side of the street are cuckolds-all except one."
When one of the husbands asked his wife why she was so pensive, she replied,
"I am studying which of our neighbors can it be that is not cuckold."
The modernized version of the same quip is one which many of us have heard:
A husband comes home greatly perturbed. He says to his wife, "They tell me
the janitor boasts that he has slept with every woman in our apartment build-
ing except one." "Hmm," says the wife. "It must be that stuck-up Mrs. Nuss-
baum on the seventh floor."
Perhaps this is still not hysterical, but sufficient, at least, for illustrative purposes.
91. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), affd,
309 U.S. 309 (1940); Golding v. R.K.O., 35 Cal.2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950). See also 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.01, at 2-5.
92. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
93. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970);
Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1965); Wihtol v.
Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956).
94. Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d at 103; Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris
& Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927); Hollywood Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Dushkin,
136 F. Supp. 738, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
95. Anonymous quotation, B. COLLINS, PLANET OF THE YOUNG 61 (1977).
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infrequent practice; and two, that despite such copying, origi-
nality is achievable. The question remains, however, how and
when does a comic "independently create" humor.
Joke writing, like all literary writing, is an art, composed of
structure and purpose, rhythm and phrasing. Psychologists
note, and comics are aware, that there are certain basic themes
which people generally find amusing.9 6 Aristotle believed that
these fundamentals of humor included "catching sight of the
shameful parts, seeing a comic fall, noting error in one of the
five senses, witnessing inconsequential loss, and seeing the
human bottom."97 A comedian may derive inspiration through
casual observation of everyday things, by watching the news,
through interaction with others, or even while ad-libbing a co-
medic performance. No matter how a comic arrives at his final
works, as long as they are independently created and not cop-
ied, the originality test for copyright purposes has been met.
D. Nature of the Rights Granted
Assuming that jokes can and often do meet the requirements
for federal copyright protection, there is still a question
whether the authors of comedy should be afforded all, or just
some, of the rights granted under the Copyright Act.98
Presumably, the author of a joke would have the exclusive
rights, under copyright, to reproduce99 and distribute'01 his
original work, subject to various exceptions for "fair use."''
96. See generally L. JOUBERT, TREATISE ON LAUGHTER (1980); A. CHAPMAN & H.
FOOT, HUMOR AND LAUGHTER: THEORY, RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS (1976).
97. L. JOUBERT, supra note 96, at xii.
98. Title 17, § 106 grants the owner of a copyright the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to pre-
pare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute cop-
ies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individ-
ual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
99. Id. § 106(1).
100. Id. § 106(3).
101. Id. § 107. The fair use provision of the 1976 Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
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Thus, the unauthorized use of another's comic matter in a book
or script would constitute copyright infringement.
The right to control derivative works 10 2 has more complex
implications. Clearly this exclusive grant would enable the
owner to prohibit use of his work in a compilation, 10 3 transla-
tion, adaptation, or other form of derivative work.0 4 This right
might also enable the copyright owner who has licensed out
his material to sue for infringement should his work be signifi-
cantly altered by the licensee.0 5
Of primary importance to the comic, would be his right to
control the performance of his work. 06 Of course this exclu-
sive grant would not inhibit the private telling of jokes between
individuals, but would only prohibit public performances of the
copyrighted works. 107 The Copyright Act subjects the perform-
ance right to various fair use exceptions °8-most notably that
which, in essence, allows as "fair use" the public performance
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
102. Id. § 106(2).
103. Id. Section 101 defines "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or ar-
ranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship."
104. Id. Section 101 defines "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictional-
ization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, con-
densation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifica-
tions which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative
work.'"
105. Cf. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1976) (court
held that if an assignment or license is silent with respect to making changes in the
work, then unauthorized changes which are so extensive, for example, omitting 24 of
the original 90 minutes of recording, as to impair the integrity of the original work
constitute copyright infringement).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982).
107. Id. Section 106(4) only grants the exclusive right to "perform the copyrighted
work publicly."
108. Id. § 110.
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of a nondramatic literary or musical work which is not for
profit. 10 9 Perhaps this non-profit exception should not apply to
the performance right of jokes. 110
If a joke can be protected by copyright, can it nevertheless
become so overtold as to become banal,"' thereby losing previ-
ously secured protection and becoming part of the public do-
main? This question does not go to the question of original
copyrightability, but instead suggests a breed of involuntary
abandonment once a joke has become, quite ironically for the
author, too popular to enforce." 2
The court in Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films
Corp. 3 touched on this issue when it rejected defendants'
contentions that comedian Lenny Bruce's own unrestricted
use of his comic material in conversation both on- and offstage
109. Id. Section 110(4) exempts from the exclusive rights granted to the copyright
owner "performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work otherwise than in a
transmission to the public, without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial ad-
vantage and without payment of any fee or other compensation for the performance to
any of its performers, promoters, or organizers ... "
110. Seemingly, this rationale would not be applicable in the case of jokes because,
in view of the fleeting value of comedy, whether an audience hears a joke for the first
time on either a profit or non-profit basis, any subsequent performances of that joke
will most likely be greatly diminished in effect to those same listeners.
111. Whether a work is too "banal" or "stock" for copyright purposes has been the
subject of several court discussions. See, e.g., Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films
Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (court deleted from the realm of protec-
tion several jokes involving "stock situations"); London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d
Cir. 1916) (no infringement, despite copying, because plaintiff's work consisted of old
or stock situations); see also Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Echevarria v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935). But see 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 13, § 2.01[A], at 2-10.1 ("to say that there is no copyright infringement of
plaintiff's work merely because it consists of (an original expression of) old or stock
situations is 'clearly contrary to the prevailing rule' that novelty is not a prerequisite
for copyright protection"). For a discussion of the issue of banality as it applies in the
law of trademarks and trade names, in the distinction between "strong" and "Weak"
marks, see Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1951). A
greater likelihood of public confusion, as a necessary element to a trademark infringe-
ment suit, is required in the case of a "weak" mark. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Walt Disney
Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226,96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971) ("The Love Bug" held to be a "weak"
title); National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d
478, 487 (7th Cir. 1982) (a "common descriptive name" is not protected even if it has
acquired a secondary meaning).
112. Abandonment of the copyright constitutes an effective defense to an infringe-
ment action. Works to which the copyright has been abandoned fall into the public
domain. However, abandonment has only been held to occur when "there is an intent
by the copyright proprietor to surrender rights in his work." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 6,
§ 13.06, at 13-103 (emphasis added). See Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp.
1241 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affid, 536 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976).
113. 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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could be construed as abandonment of his copyright. The
court held instead that "abandonment is not to be found in
negative behavior." 114 However, what if it is not, as in Marvin
Worth, the comic himself but rather the public that is using the
copyrighted material in offstage conversation?"' A joke has
been defined as "something everyone decries and everyone
tries to tell."' 6 Should a joke, at the point when it becomes
overtold, lose protection?
It would seem that this concern should more appropriately
speak to the duration of the copyright in jokes, 1 7 rather than to
the abandonment or preclusion of such protection. A song
does not lose its copyright once it becomes popular, even if it is
spouting from the lips of every teenager in America. Indeed, in
view of the conversational and fast spreading nature of the
joke, it might very well be more suitable to grant the joke a
much shorter term of copyright than the "author's life plus fifty
years" 118 which is afforded to other forms of literary works.
Suffice it to say at this point that while jokes have unique qual-
ities which should not preclude copyright protection, perhaps
they do call for a more tailored fitting of the Act to suit their
uniqueness.
VI
Limits on Protectibility of Jokes
The special traits of jokes, while warranting copyrightability,
may also present limitations on extending protection.
A. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Copyright may be claimed only in the "expression" of a work
114. Id. at 1273 (quoting from National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications,
191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951)). The Worth court noted that, although the author of any
copyrighted work may abandon his copyright before or after publication, he "must
,abandon' it by some overt act which manifests his purpose to surrender." 319 F. Supp.
at 1273.
115. As noted above, copyright does not prevent private performances, but only pre-
cludes public performances of another's protected work. Thus, private tellings be-
tween individuals would not be prohibited by a copyright subsisting in a joke or jokes.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
116. L. UNTERMEYER, A TREASURY OF LAUGHTER XViii (1980).
117. Title 17, § 302(a) grants to the authors of works created on or after January 1,
1978, a term of copyright consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the
author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). Sections 303 and 304 address the duration of
copyrights for works created prior to January 1, 1978. Id. §§ 303-304.
118. Id. § 302(a).
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of authorship and not in the "idea."11 9 Long recognized by the
courts 120 and included as an express limit of the 1976 Copyright
Act,' 2 ' the "idea-expression dichotomy" is as well known to
scholars and practitioners of copyright law as is the standard
"knock-knock" joke to the punster. While the latter will instan-
taneously evoke the response, "Who's there?", the former will
almost as frequently conjure up the remark, "Where do we
draw the line?" Neither has a single correct answer, but rather,
responses will vary from case to case, and from quip to quip.
The idea-expression distinction places a damper on the pro-
tectibility of all works of authorship. When the idea and not
the expression of a joke provides the humor, it will be hard, if
not impossible, for the joke writer to claim protectibility.122
The "infringer" who can change enough of the expression
while retaining the borrowed idea will evade liability. How-
ever, while the idea-expression dichotomy may limit the value
or extent of the potential copyright protection in the joke, it
will not destroy it completely. The idea-expression distinction
does not sound the death-knell of protection but merely
sounds the alarm when the border of protectibility has been
crossed.
First, can the value of a joke ever lie in the particular expres-
sion and not merely in the idea? Clearly, it can. In fact, it is
often the exact expression of a joke that is copied. The
punchline is one example,'123 the "one-liner" another, where
119. The law of copyright makes the fundamental distinction between the pro-
tectible "expression" and the nonprotectible "idea." To grant property status to a
mere idea, it is reasoned, would permit withdrawing the idea from the stock of materi-
als which would otherwise be open to other authors, thereby "narrow [ing] the field of
thought open for development and exploitation .. " Hence, this would hinder rather
than promote the purpose of the copyright laws, i.e., the progress of "science and use-
ful arts." Indeed, it has been said that "[c Iopyright protection is extended to authors
mainly with a view to inducing them to give their ideas to the public, so that they may
be ... used for the intellectual advancement of mankind." Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404,
408-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.03 [D], at 2-32; 3 M.
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 13.03[A], at 13-19.
120. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960); Sid and Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
121. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or em-
bodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
122. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.13, at 2-174.4.
123. But see McCrum v. Eisner, 87 L.J. Ch. 99, 117 LT.R. 536 (1918); MacG. C.C.
(1917-23) 14, discussed supra notes 44 and 45, in which the English court held there
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the changing of just one word might render the otherwise
clever jest humorless. For instance, compare the antiquated,
"Did you take a shower, because there's one missing?" with a
slightly altered, "Did you shower because there's one miss-
ing?" The copying of the exact expression is necessary in or-
der to exploit the work's value.
Second, two elements are necessary to a plaintiff's case in an
infringement action: ownership of copyright by the plaintiff
and copying by the defendant.'24 One need not copy a work
verbatim to be an infringer. Copying, for copyright purposes,
requires only access and "substantial similarity."'25 The test of
"substantial similarity" can be a difficult one to apply, not just
in the case of jokes, but with all works of authorship.'26 While
the courts have made valiant efforts to create tests to distin-
guish between copying the unprotected "idea" and copying an-
other's protected "expression," no single test has yet become
predominant.12
7
was no infringement, despite the defendant's cartoon being based on the same "punch-
line" as plaintiffs ("And then we have the rest of the day to ourselves!" said by a
soldier, twenty-four hours of whose daily time belonged to the army). The court's deci-
sion, however, was based on lack of originality of the joke with plaintiff, and no finding
of copying by defendant; had there been the requisite originality and copying, it is
likely the case would have been decided differently.
124. See, e.g., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976);
Sid and Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977); Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1975), afd, 536 F.2d 164
(7th Cir. 1976).
125. See supra note 124. Professor Nimmer discusses substantial similarity under
two broad headings: (1) comprehensive nonliteral similarity, and (2) fragmented lit-
eral similarity. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 13.03.
126. In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960), Judge Learned Hand, in describing the difficulties of determining "substantial
similarity," stated, "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has
gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must
therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Note however that even Judge Hand employed what
he viewed as the "abstractions" test in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930), in attempting to discern "substantial similarity."
127. Courts and commentators alike have developed a number of tests to aid in
making the difficult determination of substantial similarity, e.g., Learned Hand's "ab-
stractions" or "patterns" formula, supra note 126, set out in Nichols v. Universal. See
also Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933) ("audience" or "ordi-
nary observer" test); W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82, 87 (6th
Cir. 1928) ("common errors" test). See generally M. MALEVINSKY, THE SCIENCE OF
PLAYW~rrNG (1925); Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 CoLum. L. REV.
503 (1945); Fleming, Substantial Similarity: Where Plots Really Thicken, 19 COPYRIGHT
L. Symp. (ASCAP) 252 (1971); Sorenson and Sorenson, Re-examining the Traditional
Legal Test of Literary Similarity: A Proposal for Content Analysis, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
638 (1952).
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Hence, one may copy another's joke, alter the wording to
some extent, and still be considered an infringer. Slight differ-
ences and variations will not serve as a defense. 128 Providing
there is substantial similarity, copyright infringement may still
be found even if the second work is an improvement over the
original.
129
B. Should Brevity Preclude Protection?
Neither the Constitution nor the Act itself requires a work to
be of minimum length for copyrightability. Nevertheless, one
could argue that the courts' refusal to grant copyright protec-
tion to titles implies that brevity precludes such protection.
130
If so, then the brevity of a joke might prevent its
copyrightability.
Is brevity the reason why titles are denied protection? Pro-
fessor Nimmer comments that "[a]s a matter of first impres-
sion, it might well be argued that fanciful original titles should
be regarded as a form of literary expression, protectible under
the copyright laws."'' Although in general, particular words
and "small common phrases" have been largely denied protec-
tion,13 2 unless "especially unique or qualitatively important,"' 3
there have been instances where short phrases have been pro-
tected under copyright. For example, in American Greetings
128. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947);
Fleischer v. Freundlich, 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934).
129. See cases cited supra note 128.
130. Although nothing in the Constitution or in the Copyright Act precludes protec-
tion of titles, it is clear, as a matter of statutory construction by the courts, that titles
may not be granted statutory copyright. See, e.g., Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d
320 (8th Cir. 1962); Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943). Additionally, it is
almost equally clear, as a matter of state law, that titles are not protected under com-
mon law copyright. See Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, 36 Cal.2d 116, 222 P.2d 433
(1950); Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 269 Cal App. 2d 31, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1969). See also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1959) (amended 1973) (Copyright Office Regula-
tions denying statutory protection to titles).
131. 1 M. NIMMaR, supra note 13, § 2.16, at 2-186.
132. Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc. 208 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1954); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v.
Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consul-
tants Int'l, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 495 (1981) (denying protection to particular words).
133. Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("un-
less the reappearing phase is especially unique or qualitatively important, there is no
basis for inferring copying .. "); Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(three passages held to constitute "insufficient similarity"); Leeds Music Ltd. v. Robin,
358 F. Supp. 650, 657 (S.D. Ohio 1973) ("a claim of piracy cannot be based upon the use
of common words and phrases . . ").
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Corp. v. Kleinfab Corp. ," the phrase "Put on a Happy Face"
was held copyrightable. Further, another court stated that
"[a] given word in Keats' Ode is not perhaps copyrightable,
but its use in a poetic line would be."'35
In works that are clearly protected by the copyright laws, the
courts do not seem to make distinctions based on length. In
the area of poetry,136 one can presume that the Haiku poem is
protected, even though such works are, by definition, only
three lines long. Song lyrics are protected under the Act, 137 de-
spite the fact that the entire lyrics for certain songs may con-
sist of only one repeated line. 38
If length were a prerequisite to copyright protection, and
brevity a preclusion, where would the line be drawn? With one
sentence, or two? Would a seven page saga on roses merit pro-
tection, while Gertrude Stein's "A Rose is A Rose is A Rose"
would be denied? Is the former more worthy of protection? To
deny copyright protection on the basis of brevity could have a
chilling effect on authors, discouraging shorter works from be-
ing created. This would be undesirable indeed, for it is often
the shorter work which can have the most impact, being more
easily read, remembered, and quoted.
In addition, brevity in the amount of work copied does not
prohibit an action for infringement. "Nor is it necessary that
the whole or even the larger portion of the work should be
134. 400 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
135. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); accord O'Brien v. Chappel & Co., 159 F. Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Gingg
v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 56 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1944); Life Music, Inc.
v. Wonderland Music Co., 241 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (protection for a single word
suggested as a possibility); Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,
431 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Iowa 1977) (copying of one paragraph, consisting of three
sentences, held to infringe); Dawn Assocs. v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 831 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (one sentence, part of a motion picture promotional ad, when copied, held to
constitute infringement).
136. Poems are protected as "literary works," 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1) (1976).
137. Title 17 U.S.C. section 102(a) (2), provides for the protection of "musical works,
including any accompanying words." If the words and music have been integrated into
a single work, the copyright as a "musical work" will protect unauthorized use of the
music alone, the words alone, or a combination of both. See F.A. Mills v. Standard
Music Roll Co., 223 F. 849 (D.C.N.J. 1915), affd, 241 F. 361 (3d Cir. 1917); Mills Music,
Inc. v. Arizona, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 22 (D.D.C. Ariz. 1975). Furthermore, if the lyrics
have not been integrated with music by the original author, such words alone are copy-
rightable as a "literary work". See 1 M. NimmEN supra note 13, § 2.05[B], at 2-55.
138. See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (copyrighted work was a song in which
the entire lyrics consisted of the four words "I Love New York").
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taken in order to constitute an invasion of a copyright."' 39
Thus, it would seem illogical to label the copying of a small
part of a very large work an infringement and at the same time
withhold an infringement label from the copying of brief work
in its entirety.
Rather than look at the length of a work, the better approach
in granting copyright protection simply lies in the traditional
idea-expression dichotomy. Drawing lines based on length
could not only chill or discourage shorter works from being
written, but would also artificially and unfairly distinguish be-
tween equally meritorious works.
C. The Oral Tradition Speaks Trouble: Dissecting and Detecting
Infringement
As noted above, a joke, in its composition, bears many simi-
larities to other forms of protected literary works. However,
the route by which most jokes travel to reach their audiences
can be a problem to the joke writer who wishes to maintain an
infringement action. For a joke, unlike the novel, most often
reaches its listeners through the "oral tradition," that is, from
mouth to ear, rather than from page to eye. A joke is quite sus-
ceptible to manipulation by the "infringer." Because many a
comic's success depends not so much on what she says, but
rather the way she says it, a skillful comedienne can take an-
other's joke, inject just enough of her own style into it so that
the laughs seem attributable to her performance instead of the
pirated joke, and potentially escape liability for any
infringement.
The "oral tradition" cries out for the use of a specially tai-
lored analysis in dissecting and detecting copyright infringe-
ment of jokes. In the days of Aristotle, the philosopher himself
distinguished between the "laughable in deed" and the "laugh-
able in word."'40 Tiptoeing humbly in the footsteps of Aris-
totle, this author poses a legal analysis of humor that divides
comedy into "humor as applied" and "humor on its face."
139. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136) (if "so much
is taken [from a copyrighted work that its] value . . .is sensibly diminished, or the
labors of the original author are substantially, to an injurious extent, appropriated by
another, that is sufficient ... to constitute an infringement .... ).
140. L. JOUBERT, TREATISE ON LAUGHTER xi (1980), describes Aristotle's "laughable
in deed" as a label for the comic as witnessed, while the "laughable in word" would be
the comic as recounted.
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The joke as told, as opposed to as written, for example, in
book form, consists of both literary and performance ingredi-
ents. A very good joke can often be successful despite a poor
telling, while sometimes a rather weak bit seems uproarious
when told by a skilled comedian. "Humor as applied" would
consist of that which is personal to the comic himself, such as
voice inflection, stance, appearance, facial movements and the
other nonverbal elements which constitute his unique style. In
contrast, "humor on its face," or humor "per se," would consist
of the actual verbal content of the words spoken, absent the
comic's nonverbal injections: the way the joke would look
were it written. Generally a joke will not fit neatly into one
category or the other, but most often will be comprised of a
winning, or losing, combination of both the comic matter and
the comic telling.
Clearly, the closer the unauthorized use of the pirated mate-
rial is to the "humor on its face" category, the easier the case
would be for the original author who is trying to maintain an
infringement action. This would be an instance of verbatim or
"substantially similar" misappropriation with little or no injec-
tion of personal style by the infringer. However, when the mis-
appropriation moves further away from the pure pilfering of
"humor on its face" and more into the realm of "humor as ap-
plied," the harder the case becomes for the author.
All is not lost, though, for the original joke creator when his
work is taken and disguised under the veil of a pirate's per-
formance, for there are many possible forms and levels of "hu-
mor as applied." Three such types, often overlapping, can be
labelled as "goodwill humor," "gimmick humor," and "persona
humor." These three classes of "humor as applied" can have
different degrees of significance for the original author who has
been a victim of comedic theft.
"Goodwill humor" can best be seen by looking at the "clas-
sic" comedians, such as Bob Hope or George Burns, who have
built up a loyal following, or comedic "goodwill," over the
years. These comics draw large audiences and large laughs al-
most in spite of, or without relevance to, the actual humor in
their material. "Gimmick humor" describes the genre of
comics who employ tools or props to get their big laughs. In
these cases, it is the gimmick,'4 1 rather than what is actually
141. It may be noted that mechanical devices used in connection with a dramatic
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being said, that is the focal point of the act. The jokes them-
selves are subservient. "Persona humor," the third class of
"humor as applied," describes that brand of comedian with
such a strong style or "persona"'4 2 that the material he uses, no
matter what it is, takes on a wholly different tone when he per-
forms it. This type of humor is typified ly the comic who
speaks with a thick foreign accent or a lisp, or one who mixes
up the words to the jokes during the telling. 143
To the extent that any performer makes a "substantially sim-
ilar" use of another's original work, no matter what type of "hu-
mor as applied," a case of infringement should be made. The
"gimmick" comic has added his own style, but has not changed
the essence of the verbal joke as it is told. The comedian who
relies on goodwill should clearly not escape liability if he has
used another's independently created work; merely having a
following big enough to ensure that one gets a laugh is not
enough.
It is the "persona" comic who poses the most trouble for the
abused original author. At what point is her injection of style
enough to take the pirated joke out of the range of "substantial
similarity"? In many cases, the original author will be out of
luck. Yet, it is questionable whether merely telling the same
joke with a different accent or voice inflection, or even the jum-
bling of words, would be a sufficient "change" to allow the "in-
fringing" performer to adopt the work as his own.
The test of "substantial similarity" has always been a diffi-
cult one to characterize.1 4 The difficulties are amplified when
the work in question contains both literary and performance
ingredients. One determination which is not difficult to make,
however, is that a comedian's cultivation of his own style, an
art itself worthy of reward, should not excuse the stealing of
the fruits of another's labors as a means of reaping those
rewards.
presentation are not in themselves capable of copyright protection. See Serrana v. Jef-
ferson, 33 F. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1888); Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1903).
142. But see Harold Lloyd, 162 F.2d at 363 ("the mere motions, voice and postures of
actors and mere stage business is not subject of copyright protection .. "); Bloom &
Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903); Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records,
Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Savage v. Hoffmann, 159 F. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
143. For example, comedian Norm Crosby gained comic recognition by substituting
the "wrong" words into otherwise ordinary jokes; comedian Bill Dana's routine con-
sists of telling jokes in a Puerto Rican accent.
144. See cases cited supra notes 126-127.
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VII
Conclusion
Like the bee fated to die with his very first sting, the come-
dian faces a constant dilemma. While his greatest desire is to
be able to perform or disseminate his comic creations to the
public, it seems that he does so at the peril of losing all claim
therein. The wrongs suffered by the joke writer require reme-
dies; the copyright law can and should provide them.
To date, case law has explicitly held that a joke is capable of
copyright protection only when it is incorporated within a
larger protectible work. Yet there is no reason why courts in
the future should not go further to hold that jokes in and of
themselves are copyrightable entities, provided they meet the
Act's requisite elements. Jokes can and often do meet the re-
quirements of the Copyright Act. If properly fixed in a tangible
medium and independently created by the author, the jokes
merit the same protection as other works of authorship. If the
expression, that is, that which is substantially similar to the
original joke, is copied, then an infringement action should lie
as a waiting sword for the imperiled comic author.145
In recognizing the rights of the joke writer under copyright,
one must also consider modes of enforcing those rights. One
potential starting point might be the creation of a "Joke
Writer's Society" with which a joke writer could register his
original works. The non-originating comic, upon hearing a joke
or jokes which he would like to use in his own act, would have
the affirmative obligation to check to see if such jokes are regis-
tered with the society. Any works not registered would pre-
sumptively be in the public domain and unauthorized use of
registered jokes would constitute copyright infringement.
Many joke writers might, in addition, wish to "license" their
comic works. The music industry has handled a similar situa-
tion involving the works of musical composers by creating an
enforcement and licensing scheme for songs.146 The American
145. Of course, if a joke is not fixed in a tangible medium of expression-the ad-lib
being the perfect example-there is a big obstacle to extending copyright protection.
See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
146. See 2 M. NUIMER, supra note 13, § 8.19, at 8-238: 'The performance right as it
relates to musical works is ... the most difficult to police and enforce on an individual
basis .... Musical works, however, by their very nature may be performed on such
an extensive basis as to render it impossible for individual composers and publishers
to enforce effectively their performance rights on an individual basis."
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Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) are private enterprises that con-
trol the performance copyrights to most musical works pub-
lished in the United States.147 The copyright owner of a song
licenses his performance right 1" to one of these organizations,
and the organization in turn issues the desired works out to
licensees, and distributes royalties to the original copyright
owners. 149
Such a licensing scheme for jokes would necessarily have to
undergo many alterations; most notably, one would have to
take into account the diminishing value of the joke, in contrast
to the song, and the dangers of comedic fatality from "overex-
posure." For purposes of this treatment it is enough that the
wrongs being inflicted upon joke writers be brought to light,
and the need for remedies be recognized.
The Copyright Act was intended to protect works of author-
ship. While the benefits of copyright have been extended to
the makers of telephone directories 150 and maps, 151 the law has,
in the past, allowed the works of joke writers and comics to be
pirated unmercifully. Until we move from a concept of "the
joker's wild" to "the joke is filed," and until we cease to allow
the joke pirates to have the last laugh, then the business of
comedy will continue, for many, to be a woeful one.
147. See S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 162-78 (1977).
148. It is only the "small," or nondramatic performing right, that the copyright
owner licenses. See Robert Stigwood Group v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1972); Per-
rone, Small and Grand Performing Rights, 20 BuL. CopYRIGIrr Soc'y 19 (1972); see
generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 10.10[E].
149. ASCAP, for instance, grants two types of licenses. One is the blanket license
which permits the licensee to publicly perform for profit in a nondramatic manner any
of the songs in the ASCAP repertory in return for either a flat fee or a percentage of
gross receipt fee. The other form of license provides for payment of a specified fee for
each program in which any such music is so performed. For a detailed description of
how the societies work, see SHEMEL & KRASILoVSKY, supra note 147.
150. See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937) (copyright
in telephone directory held as valid, the court noting, "The right to copyright ... does
not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected ... show literary skill
or originality, either in thought or in language, or anything more than industrious
collection.").
151. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). "[Plictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" are defined
in § 101 to include maps, globes, and charts. See also Amsterdam v. Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc., 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951) (discussing the copyrightability of maps).
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